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THE WRITS OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS AND
CORAM VOBIS
EDWARD N. ROBINSON*
After the completion of an unsuccessful litigation, an
attorney may find that. certain facts existed which, if they
had been brought to the attention of the court during the
trial, would have prevented the judgment. Yet, the more
familiar procedural remedies may be inappropriate or may
have long before expired leaving him without apparent re-
course to the courts. With origins buried deep in the an-
nals of procedural history, there is a common law writ
known as the writ of error coram nobis or coram vobis,
which has aided many a client and lawyer in the hour of
desperation. It is the purpose of this article to reacquaint
the lawyer with certain aspects and characteristics of the
writ and to consider its availability in those jurisdictions
where it has not been abolished.'
General Usage of the Writ
Coram nobis (before us, the King, i.e. the King's or
Queen's Bench) is so called from that clause in the old
forms which described the record and process as remaining
"before us" (quae corum nobis resident). Coram vobis (be-
fore you, the justices) was the corresponding term used in
Common Pleas. In the United States, coram nobis is the
name generally employed, although some courts use coram
vobis to refer to a writ directed by a court of review to the
* 3rd year law student, Duke University; B.S. U.S. Military Acad-
emy, 1945.
1 As to the origin and development of the writ see Sanders v. State,
85 Ind. 318, 325 (1882); Orfield, The Writ of Error coram Nobis in Civil
Practice, 20 VA.L.REv. 423, 425 (1934); Note, 10 NEB.L.BuLL. 314 (1932);
Comment, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 596 (1949); Tweed v. Lockton, 35 Del. 474,
167 A. 703, 705 (1932). The writ of error coram nobis was abolished in
England by the Common Law Procedure Act. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAr, 522 (1947).
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court which tried the cause.2  From early times, the writ
has been used in both criminal and civil proceedings.8
The distinction between 'an ordinary writ of error or
appeal and a writ of error coram nobis is that the former is
brought for an error of law apparent on the record and
takes the case to a higher tribunal, while the latter is brought
for an error of fact not appearing and lies in the court
which tried the case. 4 A writ of error coram nobis is not an
appellate remedy. The purpose of this writ is not to author-
ize a court to review its opinion, but only to vacate some
adjudication made,5 and should the error alleged be in the
judgment itself, then remedial action must be sought through
appeal or writ of error.6
The facts, upon which the writ of error coram nobis is
sought, must have existed at the time of the pronouncement
of the judgment.7 The writ will not lie to contradict or put
in issue any fact that has already been adjudicated, even
though erroneously decided.8 The reason the fact was not
disclosed at the prior trial must have been due to fraud,
duress, or excusable error, and not negligence on the part
of the party now seeking the writ.9 Moreover, the fact in
question must be such as would have prevented rendition
of the judgment at the former trial, had it been available,
2 Tweed v. Lockton, 35 Del. 474, 167 A. 703, 705 (1932); Ballentine's
Law Dictionary, Coram Vobis, p1373. "Coram nobis is Issued by the
court in which the judgment assailed was rendered; while the writ of
coram vojbis is issued by a supervening court to a lower court In which
the judgment was rendered." Roughton v. Brown, 53 N.C. 393 (1861).
See also Teller v. Wetherell, 6 Mich. 45 (1858).
3 Note, 59 YALE L.J. 786 (1950); Orfield, The Writ of Error Corain
Nobis in Civil Practice, 20 VA. L. REV. 423 (1934).
1 Roughton v. Brown, 53 N.C. 393 (1861); People v. Lyle, 21 Cal. App.
2d 132, 68 P.2d 378 (1937); Tweed v. Lockton, 35 Del. 474, 167 A. 703;
Fine v. United States, 67 F.2d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 1933); 10 A.L.R. 648
(1921); 30 A.L.R. 686 (1924).
Madden v. Ferguson, 182 Ill.App. 210 (1913).
0 Williams v. Edwards, 12 N.C. 118 (1851).
Collins v. State, 66 Kan. 201, 71 P. 251 (1903); People v. Walton,
10 Cal.App.2d 413, 51 P2d 1117 (1935).
8 People v. Lyle, 21 Cal. App.2d 132, 68 P.2d 378 (1937); People v.
Budasi, 287 Ill.App. 117, 4 N.E.2d 756 (1936).
Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882); Note, 58 A.L.R. 1286; Wheeler
v. State, 158 Ind. 687, 63 N.E. 975 (1902).
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not that such facts might have produced a different result
had they been known to the judge and jury.10 Though there
is some authority contrary, it seems fairly well settled that
evidence cumulative to that provided at the trial is insuffi-
cient to justify issuance of the writ11 as is newly discovered
evidence going to the merits of the issues decided.12
The writ of error coram nobis is strictly a common law
writ and does not issue out of a court of chancery.' 3 It does
not lie in a court where there is no record of the case, 14 and
only a party to the judgment or one in privity to him can
prosecute the writ. 5 There is a division of authority as to
whether it is a writ of right- or is to be issued in the discre-
tion of the court.' 7 However, most courts, which today rec-
ognize the writ, require a sworn affidavit showing to a reas-
onable certainty error of fact resulting in the erroneous
decision.' 8 Any presumptions indulged in by the court
entertaining the petition for writ of error coram nobia are
to be in favor of the original judgment.19
The writ may be issued after the trial term has expired, 20
but whenever possible the judge who heard the original
case should pass on the issuance of the writ granting a new
10 Corr v. Buddendorff, 98 Miss. 98, 54 So. 84 (1911); Thompson v.
State, 154 Fla. 769, 18 So.2d 788 (1944).
n Howard v. State, 58 Ark. 229, 24 S.W. 8 (1893); Dobbs v. State, 63
Kan. 321, 65 P. 658 (1901). In the latter case, the court denied a new
trial where it was sought on the grounds that it could be proved that
another committed the crime for which the defendant was convicted. ,
12 Note, 33 A.L.R. 84 (1924); State v. Asbell, 62 Kan. 209, 61 P. 690
(1900); Mandel v. People, 76 Colo. 296, 231 P. 199 (1924); U.S. v. Gard-
zielewski, 135 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1943). There is some authority contra.
See George v. State, 211 Ind. 429, 6 N.E.2d 336 (1937).
13 Reid v. Strider, 7 Gratt. 76 (Va. 1850)-(or 48 Va. 39).
21 Roughton v. Brown 53 N.C. 393 (1861); U.S. v. Plummer, 27 Fed.
Cas. 561, No. 16,056 (C.C. D. Mass. 1859); Bradford v. White, 130 Ark,
532, 197 S.W. 1175 (1917).
15 Calloway v. Nifong, 1 Mo. 223 (1822); State ex rel. Potter v. Riley,
219 Mo. 667, 118 S.W. 647 (1909).
10 Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882).
17 Smith v. Kingsley, 19 Wend. 620 (N.Y. 1838); Tyler v. Morris, 20
N.C. 625 (1839); Johnson v. State, 144 Fla. 87, 197 So. 721 (1940).
28 Alexander v. State, 20 Wyo. 241, 123 P. 68 (1912).
11 Chapman v. North American Life Ins. Co., 292 Ill. 179, 126 N.E.
732 (1920).
20 Nickels v. State, 86 Fla. 208, 98 So. 502 (1923).
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trial.21- Where a conviction has once been affirmed by an
appellate court, it is generally held that the trial court
cannot entertain the application for the writ of coram nobis,
without the permission of the appellate court.22 The legal
sufficiency of the evidence to justify setting aside a judg-
ment, on writ of coram nobis, is a question of law on which
the trial court's finding is not binding on the appellate court,
which, in effect means that where no appeal has been had
from the original hearing, the petition should be filed in
that trial court and in case of an adverse ruling, an appeal
may be had to an appellate court for a review of the legal
sufficiency of the grounds upon which the petition is based.2 3
It is generally said that no statute of limitations will run
-against issuance of the writ, while others bar it because of
laches. 24 Even though a defendant has paid his fine and
served his sentence, the question as to issuance of the writ
" Murphy v. Daly, 296 Ind. 179, 188 N.E. 769 (1934). Judge is with-
out jurisdiction during vacation to hear or determine matters submit-
ted by writ of coram nobis. Special judge who rendered final judgment
retained jurisdiction to entertain petition for writ of error coram nobls
filed six years after judgment, and another special judge appointed to
hear petition had no jurisdiction where it was not shown that the first
judge refused to act or was disqualified. State ex. rel. Chadd v. Ameri-
can Surety Co. of N.Y., 66 S.W.2d 941 (Mo.App. 1933).
Washington v. State, 92 Fla. 740, 110 So. 259 (1926); Latham v.
Hodges, 35 N.C. 267 (1852). Contra: Buckler v. State, 173 Miss. 350,
161 So. 683 (1935).
3 State v. Hudspeth, 191 Ark. 963, 88 S.W.2d 858 (1935); Partlow v.
Indiana, 194 Ind. 172, 141 N.E. 513, 30 A.L.R. 1414 (1923). The reason
for the rule is that a lower court has no control or right of review
over the ruling of a higher court. However, the cases cited say nothing
about getting authority of an upper court to petition to petition the trial
court for review which would obviously satisfy the rationale of these
cases. State v. Calhoun, 50 Kan. 523, 32 P. 38 (1893); Ernst v. State,
111 Kan. 350, 207 P. 192 (1922).
2 State v. Wallace, 209 Mo. 358, 108 S.W. 542 (1908); Ernst v. State,
179 Wisc. 646, 192 N.W. 65 (1923). Application 4% years after con-
viction is barred by laches. People v. Vernon, 9 Cal.App.2d 138, 49 P.2d
326 (1935). One seeking writ due to insanity at time of trial must bring
the petition in less than 2 years after regaining sanity. Newcomb v.
State, 129 Neb. 69, 261 N.W. 348 (1935). Rules of Civil Procedure, Art.
39, Sec. 8, devised by the American Judicature Society would allow 3
years after the entry of judgment in civil cases. Bulletin XIV, Ameri-
can Judicature Society (1919) 174. The federal courts have held 6, 9,
and 18 years as sufficient to bar the application. For argument against
the writ being barred by laches, note, 59 YALE L.J. 792, N. 28 (1949).
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is not moot, for the defendant has a right to clear his name. 25
Often, statements of general propositions of law lose their
significance, unless they are joined with examples of actual
application of these propositions to specific cases. For that
reason, consider the following rulings where unsuccessful
litigants have subsequently applied for writs of error coram
nobis. The writ has been allowed where the defendant has
pleaded guilty through mistake, duress, or fraud ;26 where
a person was convicted while totally insane ;27 where a per-
son under eighteen was sentenced to the penitentiary in
violation of a state statute ;28 where the clerk of the court
failed to obey a rule requiring him to change the assignment
upon the wrapper of the case, as the result of which a judg-
ment by default was entered by a judge whose name was
on the files ;29 where a judgment was rendered against a
minor ;30 where a person attempted embracery with one of
the jurors ;31 to exclude perjured testimony as to the identity
of the defendant ;32 where the court was misled by fraud or
mistake to suppose that it had jurisdiction over the defend-
ant's person and the fact is not apparent on the record ;33
to allow a corporation which assumed liabilities of a dis-
solved corporation to set aside a judgment rendered against
the dissolved corporation without notice to its successor
Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 186 N.E. 293 (1933).
- State v. Calhoun, 50 Kan. 532, 32 Pac. 38 (1893); Sanders v. State,
85 Ind. 318, 44 Am.Rep. 29 (1882); State v. Ray, 111 Kan. 350, 207 P. 192
(1922); Dubosky v. State, 183 Ind. 488, 109 N.E. 742 (1915); Ernst v.
State, 179 Wis. 646, 192 N.W. 65, aff'd, 181 Wis. 155, 193 N.W. 978 (1923).
27 Adler v. State, 35 Ark. 517, 37 Am.Rep. 48 (1880); Linton v. State,
77 Ark. 532, 81 S.W. 608 (1904). Where sanity'was suggested formally
or informally at or before the trial, the writ will not lie after conviction
to raise the question. Sease v. State, 157 Ark. 217, 247 S.W. 1036 (1923).
Es Bx parte Gray, 77 Mo. 160 (1882).
Hallbrook v. Lawton, 207 Ill. App. 497 (1917).
Karicofe v. Schwaner, 196 Mo.App. 595, 196 S.W. 46 (1917).
a Cutlett v. Chestnut, 117 Fla. 538, 158 So. 418 (1935). Case denied
the writ but on the grounds that the alleged embracery was committed
by one not a party to the suit and it was not shown that it resulted in
influencing the juror.
2 Davis v. State, 200 Ind. 88, 161 N.E. 375 (1928). It was there point-
ed out that the court has a discretion to grant the writ in case of per-
jured testimony of a material witness upon which the verdict probably
depended. Accord, Shock v. Indiana, 230 Ind. 469, 164 N.E. 625 (1929).
Sowers-Taylor Co. v. CoIlins, 14 S.W.2d 692 (Mo.App. 1929).
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where the court was not informed of the succession ;34 where
the court assumed non-existent facts, absence of which en-
tirely defeats jurisdiction ;35 where defendant was sued on
bank stock and was nisled by being told that all other stock-
holders were being sued along with her and that the case was
only a test case;36 to raise a due process question of con-
viction.37
This short recital of cases in which the writ of error coram
nobis was granted is far from complete due to the fact that
it only considers borderline cases in which the writ was
denied by the trial court and the appellate courts of the par-
ticular state reviewed the ruling. Hence the many cases in
which coram nobis was allowed by the trial courts are not
here reflected. As a result of this type of coverage, the fol-
lowing cases in which denial of the writ was affirmed is
necessary for a more thorough understanding of the true
characteristics and limitations of the writ. Coram nobis
has been denied by appellate courts where they were sought
on the grounds that a prosecuting witness was insane;,"
to redress an irregularity such as misconduct of jurors,
since such matters may be remedied by motion for a new
trial ;39 that defendant can show that another person com-
mitted the wrong ;40 that a material witness falsely testi-
Hecht Bros. v. Walker, 224 Mo. App. 1156, 35 S.W.2d'372 (1931).
However, determination of the fact necessary to jurisdiction, even
though erroneous, defeats new trial on that Issue by writ of coram nobis.
Baker v. Smith, 226 Mo.App. 510, 18 S.W.2d 372 (1931).
3 Rose v. Murrow, 10 Tenn.App. 698 (1929).
r Conizio v. State of N.Y., 327 U.S. 82, (1946).
ss Boyd v. Smyth, 200 Iowa 687, 205 N.W. 522 (1925).
Hamlin v. State, 67 Kan. 724, 74 P. 242, 36 A.L.R. 1443 (1903). The
writ will not lie to redress irregularities occurring during the trial,
such as misconduct of the jury, court, or any officer, except under circum-
stances amounting to extrinsic fraud. Information irregularly obtained
by jurors from judge as to how long defendant, if given life imprison-
ment, would probably be detained is remedial not by coram nobis but
by motion for new trial. People v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249, 232 P. 457, 36
A.L.R. 1435 (1924).
40 Howard v. State, 58 Ark. 229, 24 S.W. 8 (1893). Such allegation
calls for a review of the issue of fact raised by defendant's plea of not
guilty, and the writ does not lie to contradict an issue and finding of
fact. Affidavits filed by persons admitting commission of larceny for
which defendant had been convicted only constituted newly discovered
evidence and will not justify writ of coram nobis. This would be an
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fled ;41 that the defendant was unable to appeal in time ;42 that
jurors made false statements, not discovered until later ;43
that a juror had expressed an opinion in the case prior to
trial ;44 that defendant, judge, and attorney were ignorant
of statutes providing that evidence in a civil trial may not
be used in criminal trials and such evidence was used in the
conviction of the defendant ;45 that defendant was prevented
from obtaining a witness through fear of violence ;46 that
defendant can now show a legal divorce from his first wife
and a void second marriage due to duress where he was
previously convicted of bigamy;4 7 that the presiding judge
was not authorized to preside ;48 that counsel for defendant
refused to file a motion for a new trial where the defendant
confessed in open court;49 that prosecutrix now swears she
perjured herself at the trial in which the defendant was con-
victed ;49(a) and that defendant made false statements to
shield a party who promised to pay his fines.50
In attempting to reconcile the above enumerated holdings,
two rather well established principles are to be kept in
mind: (1) the writ of error cora 'nobis lies only where no
other remedy is available, which in itself would lead to a
discrepancy in rulings as to grounds for granting the writ,
due to the variations in statutory and common law proced-
easy way to obtain a new trial in every case and then the newly ad-
mitted wrongdoers could refuse to testify in open court against them-
selves. It would throw the doors open to fraud and perjury. If newly
discovered evidence showed that petitioner was wrongly convicted, it
furnishes a basis for application to the pardoning power but does not
warrant a new trial under the writ of error coram nobis. Humphreys
v. State, 129 Wash. 309, 224 P. 937 (1924).
41 State v. Asbell, 62 Kan. 209, 61 P. 690 (1900); Mandell v. People,
76 Colo. 296, 231 P. 199 (1924).
1 Collins v. State, 66 Kan. 201, 71 P. 251 (1903).
' Hamlin v. State, 67 Kan. 724, 74 P. 242 (1903).
" State ex rel. Davis v. superior Court, 15 Wash. 339, 46 P. 399 (1896).
People v. Donahoe, 223 Ill.App. 277 (1921).
40 That is a matter that should have been presented at the original
trial. Beard v. State, 81 Ark. 515, 99 S.W. 837 (1907).
'7 Bennett v. State, 106 Miss. 103, 63 So. 339 (1913).
48 People v. Donahoe, 223 Ill. App. 277 (1921).
10 Humphreys v. State, 129 Wash. 309, 224 P. 937 (1924).
10(a) Ernst v. State, 179 Wisc. 646, 192 N.W. 65 (1923).
o People v. Black, 89 Cal.A-pp.- 219, 264 P. 343 (1928).
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ural rules of appeals and petitions for new trials, and (2)
granting of the writ is in the sound discretion of the court,
in many jurisditcions, and, reversal will be ordered only
where clear abuse is shown.
Writs of Error Coram Nobis in North Carolina.
The General Assembly of the State of North Carolina has
recently passed legislation substantially affecting the avail-
ability of the writ of error coram nobis in that State. For
that reason, attention will next be directed to the judicial
development of the writ in North Carolina and the effect of
the new legislation.
"The common law writ of error coram nobis to challenge
the validity of petitioner's conviction for matters extraneous
to the record is available under our procedure." Such was
the holding of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in
1949. 5'
As authority for the writ in North Carolina, reference was
made to North Carolina General Statutes §4-1 which adopts
the common law as the law of the state, when not modified,
and to the State Constitution, Art. IV, §8, which gives the
State Supreme Court authority to exercise supervision over
the inferior courts of the State. The writ can only be
granted in the court where the judgment was rendered.
However, since in North Carolina the authority for the writ
stems from the supervisory power given the Supreme Court,
it is necessary that an application be made to the Supreme
Court for permission to apply for the writ to the Superior
Court in which the case was tried. After permission is
granted, should the trial court deny the petitioner's appli-
cation for the writ, it should find the facts, and petitioner
will be allowed to appeal to the Supreme Court for review
of the decision. If the Superior Court grants the writ, the
judgment should be vacated, the pleas stricken or permitted
51 In re Taylor, 230 N.C. 566, 53 S.E.2d 857 (1949); "The common law
writ of error coram nobis has been recognized and used in this state
in similar situations from early times and is in common use elsewhere."
State v. Daniels, 231 N.C. 17, 56 S.E.2d 2 (1949).
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to be withdrawn, and the case restored to the docket for
trial in accordance with law.52
Some of the more frequently cited cases on point, in North
Carolina, will next be considered to point out the extent of
and the limitations on the availability of the writ. One of
the first reported decisions in re coram nobis in North Caro-
lina was Tyler v. Morris,5 3 decided in 1839. There Morris
made a motion for the writ before the Superior Court on
the grounds that Tyler was dead at the time the judgment
was rendered and also for a supersedeas to the execution on
the judgment. The Superior Court denied the motion when
Tyler's attorney joined issue as to the death of Tyler. The
Supreme Court, on appeal, pointed out that before the writ
will be allowed there must be an affidavit of some error of
fact, by which, if the fact be true, the opposing party's right
of action shall fail; that granting the writ is within the dis-
cretion of the trial court; that the trial court in determining
whether to grant the writ does not base its decision on the
existence of the alleged fact as the existence of the fact is
to be determined in the subsequent trial, by a jury; and
that the writ is not a supersedeas in itself but execution can-
not be sued out on the judgment after the writ is granted,
without leave of the court.
In Latham v. Hodges,53 (a) a certain party contested a will
and on appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant was
surety on the appeal bond; judgment in favor of the will was
upheld in the Supreme Court and judgment was granted
against the defendant on the appeal bond, by the Superior
Court, this judgment being affirmed on appeal to the Su-
preme Court. Then the defendant sought a writ of error
coram nobis on the grounds that the contestant of the will
had died before the original trial before the Superior Court.
0 Ibid. For an excellent short summary of the writ of error coram
nobis in North Carolina, see report of J. C. B. Ehringhaus, Jr., special
appointee of the Supreme Court, reported in 229 N.C. 297, 49 S.E.2d 749
(1948).
1- Tyler v. Morris, 20 N.C. 625 (1839).
m(a) Latham v. Hodges, 35 N.C. 267 (1852). For two interesting cases
in the development of the writ in N.C., see Lassiter v. Harper, 32 N.C.
392 (1849) and Williams v. Edwards, 34 N.C. 118 (1951).
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The writ was denied. The court pointed out that the writ
was here sought from a judgment of the Supreme Court
and that the writ only lies in a court where the record and
the judgment are, and not to reverse the judgment of another
court, especially not a higher one. In subsequent cases
concerning the writ, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
has held that the writ may be addressed to a county court
as that too is a court of record in North Carolina; that all
parties plaintiff or parties defendant need not join in the
application as one member alone may petition therefor;4
that the writ will be denied where sought as a relief from a
judgment granted against the petitioners on appeal bond
and the petitioners had been joined as party plaintiffs with-
out authority, for the appropriate remedy in such cases in
North Carolina is a motion in the case. 5
In the case of In re Taylor,55 one of the most recent in
North Carolina, the defendant had been tried and convicted
of a capital offense without counsel; an attorney for the
defendant applied for writ of habeas corpus to the Superior
Court which denied it. The defendant then applied for
certiorari for review of the ruling as to the petition for writ
of habeas corpus and the Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's denial, noting that habeas corpus will not lie where
persons are committed or detained by virtue of the final
order, judgment, or decree of a competent tribunal of civil
or criminal jurisdiction, or by virtue of an execution issued
thereon. 57 The court pointed out that the proper remedy
would have been an application to the Supreme Court for
leave to petition the Superior Court for writ of error coram
nobis.58
During the 1950-51 Session of the North Carolina General
Assembly, a step was taken substantially affecting the avail-
ability of the writ in this State. Chapter 15, of the General
Roughton v. Brown, 53 N.C. 393 (1861). See also, Moore v. Hin-
nant, 90 N.C. 163 (1884).
Massie v. Hainey, 165 N.C. 174 (1914). Case contains excellent dis-
cussion of the writ.
51 In re Taylor, supra, note 51.
17 N.C. GEN. STAT. 1943, §17-4. In re Schenck, 74 N.C. 607 (1876).
1-3 Accord: State v. Daniels, supra, note 51.
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Statutes, was amended to provide a remedy for persons con-
victed and imprisoned in the state penitentiary, other pris-
ons of the state, and county jails whQ assert that rights
guaranteed to them by the Constitutions of the United States
or the State of North Carolina, or both, have been denied
or violated, in trials or proceedings in which they were con-
victed, as to which there has been no adjudication. The
act provides that a convict asserting such claim should com-
mence the proceeding under this article by filing with the
Clerk of the Superior Court his petition, verified by affidavit.
The proceeding is special in nature with the judge making
findings of fact and law and either granting or denying the
application for a new trial. If the judge holds in favor of
the petition for a new trial, appropriate orders are entered
for rearraignment and retrial. If he should deny the peti-
tion, review may be had by application for certiorari to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina. The act further pro-
vides that no action shall be brought thereunder more than
five years after rendition of the final judgment resulting
from a conviction, or more than three years after the effect-
ive date of this statutory provision, whichever is later, unless
the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not
due to laches or negligence on his part.
It is apparent that the statute was passed primarily to
deal with situations of the type presented in the case of In
re Taylor, supra where a constitutional right has been de-
nied. Though the statute is quite comprehensive in nature,
it would seem that it replaces the writ of coram nobis only
in those instances where it is claimed that a constitutional
right has been denied, leaving untouched the availability
of the writ for relief in other instances before mentioned,
both civil and criminal; e.g., where the defendant subse-
quently claims insanity at the time of the original trial;
where judgment was rendered against a minor; where a
defendant has entered a plea of guilty in ignorance of the
meaning, etc. For that reason, the writ of error coram nobis
may still play a substantial part in the field of relief from
error in North Carolina.
